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Abstract 
This paper appeals to novel survey information on over 30 000 individuals in 21 European 
countries to address an important and controversial question with respect to well-being: Do 
cognitive, hedonic and eudaimonic measures of well-being reflect very different aspects of 
individual quality of life? Or, more precisely, do the subjective appreciation of these 
dimensions by individuals exhibit different patterns? Our empirical results first reveal a very 
significant correlation between happiness and life satisfaction. Second, someone with high 
standard “hedonic” well-being (happiness or life satisfaction) is likely to have high 
eudaimonic well-being as well (flourishing, vitality, resilience and functioning). In addition, 
the factors that are correlated with the different measures of well-being seem to be very 
similar at the individual level. For example, marriage, higher income and greater education 
are associated with greater satisfaction, but also with higher levels of flourishing, vitality, 
resilience and functioning. This fit is not perfect, however, and men notably report lower 
levels of standard well-being measures, but higher eudaimonic well-being.  
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Is Happiness Different From Flourishing?  
Cross-Country Evidence from the ESS 
 
1.   Introduction 
There has been something of a sea-change in Economics over the past ten or fifteen years, 
with increasing attention being paid to measures of subjective well-being. This has come 
hand-in-hand with a considerable real debate about the way in which empirical analysis in 
social sciences should be carried out. In the context of well-being, one recurrent topic is 
measurement.  
As a general rule, economists have relied on the single-item measures of happiness or 
satisfaction that are now commonly found in large-scale surveys such as the British 
Household Panel Survey, the German Socio-Economic Panel, and the International Social 
Survey Programme. It is probably fair to say that to date relatively little attention has been 
paid to this choice of what measure to use in the profession,
1 beyond work that has attempted 
to show that these measures do indeed exhibit a certain amount of validity (some of which is 
surveyed in Clark et al., 2008). However, the question of which type of well-being is 
germane, and whether measures should be single- or multi-item has now become an area of 
debate and empirical exploration (e.g. Krueger and Schkade, 2008). 
In this paper, we use a dataset that contains various different measures of well-being, 
collected from the same individuals. To date, the standard variables that are considered in the 
economics literature measure feelings of satisfaction or happiness, typically with life as a 
whole or with income. These are arguably mostly hedonic measures that are based on 
pleasure. One issue regarding these standard measures has been the difference between the 
cognitive aspect of well-being, i.e. the judgements one can make about one’s life, and pure 
emotional hedonic pleasure, such as positive (or negative) affect. The first notion is likely to 
be elicited by the Life Satisfaction Question (which is considered to be partly cognitive), 
1 Economists are much less likely to design their own survey instruments than are Sociologists and 










































whereas the hedonic dimension is probably more present in the Happiness Question (see 
below). In the current paper, we will refer to both of these as standard hedonic measures (as in 
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Ongoing research is trying to disentangle these 
two dimensions, asking whether emotional feeling is just one element of the cognitive 
evaluation of individual life, or whether cognitive judgements themselves are part of the 
emotional feeling of happiness or life satisfaction. Another way to look at this is to consider 
the possibility that subjective well-being is just one element of utility, i.e. of preferences, 
alongside other arguments (see for instance the discussion in Loewenstein and Ubel, 2008, 
regarding utility, happiness and disability). 
A second issue is whether all of what makes up the good life is based only on pleasure. 
Other measures of well-being have proposed the inclusion of additional non-pleasure aspects 
of individuals’ lives, perhaps the most challenging of which is Amartya Sen’s notion of 
capabilities and functionings. These latter reflect the set of potential and actual achievements 
that are available to an individual. One key question that can then be asked is the extent to 
which these measures overlap: is hedonic pleasure just one element of individual’s 
functionings (Deci and Ryan, 2008, and Fleurbaey, 2009)? While these functionings are 
usually thought of as objective circumstances of the individual, some researchers have also 
sought to measure them via individuals’ subjective appreciations. For example, Benjamin et 
al. (2010) underline the role of both the sense of purpose and control, as well as status and 
happiness considerations, that determine individual's behaviour in hypothetical choice 
experiments. In the current paper, we appeal to measures of eudaimonia to reflect this notion 
of functioning, where eudaimonia refers to the idea of flourishing or developing human 
potential. In practical terms, the eudaimonic well-being to which we refer is measured by 
survey questions on autonomy, determination, interest and engagement, aspirations and 
motivation, and a sense of meaning, direction or purpose in life.
2  
There are of course a number of ideas of what makes up the good life. One difficulty in 
taking this debate forwards empirically has been identifying datasets that include both 
2 In their seminal 2004 paper “Beyond Money: toward an economy of well-being”, Diener and Seligman called 
for:  “a national well-being index [to] be created that systematically assesses key well-being variables for 
representative samples,  including positive and negative emotions, engagement, purpose and meaning, optimism 









































hedonic and non pleasure-based measures of well-being. In the absence of empirical analysis, 
the supposed difference between well-being measures, or the superiority of one over the 
other, has been based on persuasive arguments rather than empirical analysis. In this paper we 
are able to appeal to novel data collected in Wave 3 of the European Social Survey, which 
contains both hedonic, cognitive and eudaimonic measures of well-being. As these were 
collected from the same sample of respondents, we can provide one of the first large-scale 
analyses of the similarities and differences between these well-being measures. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data and our 
key variables and provides some initial bivariate correlations. Section 3 moves on to 
multivariate analysis and the final section concludes.  
 
2.   Pleasure and Meaning in the European Social Survey 
The data we analyse here come from the European Social Survey (the ESS: freely 
available from http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org). The ESS is a multi-country survey 
which has covered 30 different countries at various points over its first three rounds. Wave 3 
of the ESS, collected in 2006/2007, covers 25 different countries and contains a special 
module on well-being (see Huppert et al., 2009, and Clark and Senik, 2010). The original 
sample includes just over 47 000 observations. We here drop four countries, in which the 
income variables were not readily usable because they were measured and coded differently, 
and restrict the sample to those of working age (16-65), producing an analysis sample size of 
just over 32 000 individuals. 
Hedonic and cognitive measures 
To carry out the analysis proposed here, we require measures of hedonic, cognitive and 
eudaimonic well-being. The first is provided by the ESS question on happiness: respondents 
are asked “Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?”, with answers on a 
0 to 10 scale, where 0 corresponds to “Extremely Unhappy” and 10 to “Extremely Happy”. 
None of the other responses are labelled. Analogously, life satisfaction, which is a priori a 
more cognitive notion of well-being, is measured via the answer to the question “All things 









































to 10 scale, where 0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 means extremely satisfied. 
The distribution of happiness and life satisfaction in our 21 countries in Wave 3 of the 
ESS is shown in Table 1. As is often the case with respect to well-being measures, the 
distribution of both of the variables in Table 1 is right-skewed. The mean and median 
happiness scores are 7 and 8 respectively, with analogous figures for life satisfaction of 7 and 
7. The two measures appear similar to each other, and are relatively highly correlated, with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.60. Self-declared happiness is somewhat higher than self-declared 
life satisfaction. A reasonably large numbers of respondents report low values of hedonic 
well-being, with 18 per cent having happiness scores of five or less, and 24 percent life 
satisfaction scores of five or less. In terms of their distribution, life satisfaction varies 
somewhat more than happiness across countries (as reflected in the χ
2-statistics in the raw 




There are many different subjective questions in the ESS, and the answers to them can be 
combined to produce a wide variety of measures of well-being. Our first eudaimonic measure 
here is that of flourishing, as described in Huppert and So (2009). This is based on the 
answers to seven different well-being questions. The first one of these is a happiness question: 
as our goal here is to see how hedonic and eudaimonic measures relate to each other, we 
therefore drop the happiness aspect of flourishing. Our modified version of Huppert and So’s 
index is defined by the answers to the six different questions below. 
Engagement, interest   I love learning new things. 
 Meaning, purpose   I generally feel that what I do in my life is valuable and 
worthwhile. 
 Self-esteem   In general, I feel very positive about myself. 
 
3 Although a number of authors would argue that satisfaction scores are more evaluative, and hedonic measures 









































 Optimism   I’m always optimistic about my future. 
 Resilience  When things go wrong in my life it generally takes me 
a long time to get back to normal. (reverse coding) 
 Positive relationships   There are people in my life who really care about me. 
The first two of these are defined by Huppert and So as "core features", in that someone 
who is flourishing has to agree with these statements. The measure they propose of 
flourishing is thus agreement with the first two questions, plus agreement with at least three of 
the next four questions. Fifty six percent of the ESS sample is flourishing according to this 
definition.
4 
The second measure we appeal to is that developed by the New Economics Foundation 
(2008).
5 Appendix 3 of this document describes how indices are created to measure 
Emotional Well-being, a Satisfying Life, Vitality, Resilience and Self-Esteem, Positive 
Functioning, Supportive Relationships, Trust and Belonging, and Well-Being at Work. The 
first two and last one of these are obviously hedonic in nature. For the purpose of comparing 
hedonic to eudaimonic well-being we have here retained the third through fifth items in this 
list: vitality, resilience and positive functioning. Each of these three is constructed as the 
unweighted sum of the answers to a number of z-score transformed questions (such that each 
of the questions has a mean of zero and a variance of one). 
 
Vitality consists of answers to questions on how much of the time during the past week 
the individual felt tired, felt that everything they did was an effort, could not get going, had 
restless sleep, had a lot of energy, and felt rested when they woke up in the morning, plus the 
respondent's general health and whether their life involves a lot of physical activity. All of 
these are recoded so that higher values reflect greater vitality.  
Similarly, resilience and self-esteem is given the sum of the answers to the four following 
4 Cronbach’s alpha for the answers to the six measures we keep from Huppert and So’s measure is 0.63. 
5 The New Economics Foundation (NEF) is an independent think-and-do tank that aims to improve quality of 
life by promoting innovative solutions that challenge mainstream thinking on economic, environmental and 










































z-score transformed questions: "In general I feel very positive about myself", "At times I feel 
as if I am a failure", "I’m always optimistic about my future", and "When things go wrong in 
my life, it generally takes me a long time to get back to normal". Again, all of these are 
recoded so that higher numbers reflect greater resilience.  
Last, positive functioning is determined by the answers to the following questions: "In my 
daily life I get very little chance to show how capable I am", "Most days I feel a sense of 
accomplishment from what I do", "In my daily life, I seldom have time to do the things I really 
enjoy", "I feel I am free to decide how to live my life", "How much of the time during the past 
week have you felt bored?", "How much of the time during the past week have you been 
absorbed in what you were doing", "To what extent do you get a chance to learn new 
things?", "To what extent do you feel that you get the recognition you deserve for what you 
do?", and "I generally feel that what I do in my life is valuable and worthwhile".
6 
Bivariate Correlations 
The two hedonic measures, self-declared Happiness and Life Satisfaction, described 
above are both answered on 0 to 10 ordinal scales. The flourishing measure from Huppert and 
So is a binary variable, while the three New Economics Foundation measures are summed z-
scores. In the regression analysis we will keep these variables in their original formats, but to 
analyse the bivariate correlations we convert all of them to binary format. With respect to the 
hedonic measures, this is done by creating a dummy variable for reporting a score of 8 or 
more on the 0 to 10 scale (which is the case for 54 and 50 percent of the sample regarding 
happiness and life satisfaction respectively). As noted above, 56% of the ESS sample is 
flourishing according to Huppert and So's measure. Last, vitality, resilience and functioning 
are recoded into binary variables according to their respective median values, so that 50% of 
the sample has high values of these variables. 
The bivariate correlations between hedonic and eudaimonic variables are presented in 
Table 2. These correlation coefficients are all between 0.25 and 0.30, and are all significant at 
better than the 0.01% level. Note that there is no issue of sample comparability here, as both 
hedonic and eudaimonic measures are supplied by the same individuals. The right-hand side 
6 The Cronbach’s alpha scores for the sets of questions that are used to make up vitality, resilience and positive 










































of this table shows the correlations between our three different eudaimonic measures. These 
are all mostly around 0.3  as well, except that between resilience and flourishing which is 
higher at 0.5, suggesting that these three measures are not capturing exactly the same 
phenomenon. 
Another intuitive way of looking at the question of the correlation between different well-
being measures is to ask whether someone who is deprived hedonically is also more likely to 
be deprived eudaimonically. The results here are presented in Table 3. As in Table 2, there 
seems to be a reasonably strong relationship between hedonic and eudaimonic measures of 
well-being, in the sense that someone who lacks one is very likely to lack the other as well. 
This is consistent with some of the results in White and Dolan (2009), who examine both 
hedonic and eudaimonic measures of well-being using Day Reconstruction Method (DRM) 
techniques. As their Figure 1 shows, many of the activities that are considered to be 
pleasurable are also evaluated as being eudaimonically rewarding. However, the fit is by no 
means perfect and some activities (for example, eating and watching TV) are pleasurable but 
not rewarding, while others (such as work and housework) are rewarding but not pleasurable. 
Finally, the numbers in Table 3 also underline the similarity between life satisfaction and 
happiness. 
 
3.   Well-Being Regressions 
A second simple way of evaluating the difference, if any, between hedonic and 
eudaimonic measures of well-being is to carry out a regression analysis using "standard" 
socio-demographic variables as controls.
7 The results are shown in Table 4. Columns 1 and 2 
of Table 4 are estimated via an ordered probit, and column 3 via a probit (there are therefore 
no corresponding R
2 values here); the remaining three columns are estimated via OLS. 
Let us underline again the great similarity in the structure of Life Satisfaction and 
Happiness, with the exception of house-workers who are more happy than satisfied with their 
life (as compared with employed people).  
7 There are some similarities here to the work of Oswald and Wu (2010), who compare the distribution of 










































There are two levels at which the comparison between the regression results in Table 4 
can be carried out: individual-level variables, such as age, sex and education, and the country 
fixed effects. There are 17 individual socio-demographic variables in Table 4, and the perhaps 
surprising conclusion is that the patterns of hedonic and eudaimonic regressions are similar 
for the great majority of them. An opposition between the results is found for only four 
variables. Most significantly, the first column shows that men have consistently lower 
hedonic well-being scores (see Nolen-Hoeksema and Rusting, 1999), but report significantly 
higher levels of eudaimonia, such as vitality and resilience. The second sharp difference is 
found for the retired, who consistently report lower levels of eudaimonic well-being, but are 
not significantly different from non-retirees in hedonic terms. The other two variables for 
which there is some disagreement between the six columns of Table 4 are the labour-force 
status variables of Full-Time education and (to a certain extent) looking after the house and 
children: both of these groups do relatively well hedonically, but do not have higher 
eudaimonia scores. 
It thus turns out that in spite of the vivid debates about the correct notion of well-being, 
the subjective appreciation of life satisfaction, happiness and eudaimonia are similar to each 
other, and are characterized by very similar socio-demographic patterns (for example, the 
richer and the higher-educated are both more happy, more satisfied and have higher 
eudaimonia scores).
8  
However, the same is not true for groups of countries. For example, just considering life 
satisfaction and flourishing, the estimated country dummies are oppositely signed, and both 
significant, for Belgium, Bulgaria and Portugal. Further the significant life satisfaction effect 
is not reflected in any flourishing effect for the United Kingdom, Latvia, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland and Slovenia. Considering the separate eudaimonic domains of Vitality, 
Resilience and Functioning reveals a number of other differences between countries. In fact, 
only very few countries attract consistent estimated coefficients across the six columns in 
Table 4: all else equal, living in Austria is associated with significantly higher scores in all the 
8 It is worth underlining that the discussion here is couched in terms of average patterns in the data. Ths 
similarity between the two measures may be lesser if we want to identify the worst-off in the population, for 
example. In general, the distribution of individual well-being as captured by different measures seems like a 










































well-being dimensions, whereas the opposite is true of France, Latvia, Russia and Slovakia. It 
is intriguing that the group of countries whose inhabitants are always found to score higher in 
terms of subjective happiness and satisfaction, i.e. Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway 
Sweden), Ireland and Switzerland (see Senik, 2010) actually attract higher scores in all 
hedonic and eudaimonic dimensions except resilience, where the effect is negative.  
One way of formalising the above statements is to look at indices of similarity between 
the estimated sets of coefficients in the different columns of Table 4. This correlation can be 
calculated both cardinally, using Pearson correlations, and ordinally, using Spearman 
correlations. The results are shown in Table 5. Both sets of correlation coefficients tell the 
same story here. First, happiness and life satisfaction produce extremely similar data shapes. 
Whatever the cognitive component of satisfaction that is not present in happiness, it appears 
to make remarkably little difference to the shapes found in the ESS data. Second, the 
correlation between the hedonic measures and the eudaimonic measures, in terms of how they 
fit the observable explanatory variables in Table 4, is reasonably high. There is, however, one 
exception, with respect to resilience. This concept does not seem to be particularly closely 
related to either happiness or satisfaction, which is perhaps a finding that is worthy of future 
investigation.
9 
To further analyse any divergences between hedonic and eudaimonic well-being, Table 6 
presents the results from a series of probit estimations. The dependent variable in the four 
columns is a dummy variable for an individual reporting high eudaimonic well-being, as 
defined by the measures of flourishing, vitality, resilience and functioning respectively (in the 
binary sense used in Tables 2 and 3) but having low life satisfaction (i.e. a score of 7 or less 
on the 0 to 10 scale). The actual results are qualitatively very similar across these four 
columns. 
The results in the first four columns show that those who are dissatisfied but who enjoy 
9 We can carry out the same analysis as in Table 5 but limiting our attention uniquely to the estimated 
coefficients on the country dummies. Life satisfaction and happiness continue to produce almost exactly the 
same data shapes. However, the similarity between eudaimonic and hedonic measures of well-being is 
systematically lower. This means the demographic patterns of the correlates of eudaimonic and hedonic well-










































eudaimonic well-being are more likely to be men than women, and are more likely to be in 
their mid-age (around the mid-forties). This probability is also higher for the educated, the 
single and the separated. Perhaps surprisingly, income plays only a very minor role in 
distinguishing hedonic and eudaimonic well-being (in particular, it is not the case that the 
relatively better-off are happy but have less meaningful lives). With respect to labour-force 
status, both the sick and disabled and the retired are significantly less likely to report low life 
satisfaction and high levels of eudaimonia.  
The country dummies in Table 6 are for the most part very significant. These show that 
dissatisfying but "meaningful" lives are the least likely in the Nordic countries, and 
Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium; they are the most common in Bulgaria and 
Portugal (as compared to Germany, the omitted country). Any attempt at explaining this 
pattern must remain for the moment tentative. It is worth remembering that a number of 
potential individual-level variables, such as education, labour-force status and income, have 
been controlled for in this regression. Candidate explanations should therefore rely on other 
individual-level variables (such as religion for example), or aggregate variables which reflect 
cultural differences across countries.  
It is also possible to re-run all of the analysis in Table 6 for the mirror phenomenon of 
being satisfied but having lower levels of flourishing, vitality etc. This produces estimated 
coefficients that are very often oppositely signed to those in Table 6. As these do not add 
anything particular to the analysis, we have not presented them here (they are available on 
request).  
 
4.   Conclusion 
This paper has appealed to novel survey information on over 30 000 individuals in 21 
European countries to address an important and controversial question with respect to well-
being: Do cognitive, hedonic and eudaimonic measures of well-being reflect very different 
aspects of individual quality of life, as some people have suggested? Or, more precisely, does 
the subjective appreciation of these dimensions by individuals follow different patterns?  
Our empirical results first reveal a very significant correlation between the measures of 










































or life satisfaction) is likely to have high eudaimonic well-being as well (flourishing, vitality, 
resilience and functioning). In addition, the factors that are correlated with the different 
measures of well-being seem to be very similar at the individual level. For example, marriage, 
higher income and greater education are associated with greater satisfaction, but also with 
higher levels of flourishing, vitality, resilience and functioning. This fit is not perfect, 
however, and men notably report lower levels of hedonic well-being but higher eudaimonic 
well-being. This opposition is even stronger at the country level. One first conclusion to be 
drawn then is that the two types of well-being measures seem to be more similar within 
countries than they are across countries. Once again, cross-country comparisons would seem 
to be fraught with danger.  
Although the different well-being measures are correlated, the match is by no means 
complete. As such, many individuals are happy, but have low eudaimonic well-being, while 
others have meaningful lives but are not satisfied or happy. Our last set of regression results 
have shown that these phenomena are systematically correlated with a number of individual 
characteristics (although not with money) and especially with country dummies. The overall 
conclusion then is that there definitely seems to be a certain amount of overlap between the 
different subjective well-being measures. However, those who have argued that "happiness is 
not everything" do seem to have a point. Higher levels of happiness or life satisfaction do 
increase the likelihood of having a more flourishing life, but by no means guarantee it.  
We have here only started to scratch the surface of what can be done with the various 
well-being questions available in the ESS. Many important questions have not been answered. 
It would be of great interest to create some kind of multidimensional poverty index, based on 
subjective deprivation, defined over the different aspects of well-being.
10 We have not 
addressed the questions of which measure of well-being is the best or more relevant for public 
guidance. There are many ways of doing so, which take into account the variety of measures 
available. Decancq et al. (2009) use subjective information to correct for the frame of 
reference and the different values that individuals may put on different outcomes. By doing 
so, they attempt to compare underlying levels of welfare between individuals. An additional 
10 With respect to quantitative variables, this is discussed in Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003); the case of 









































way of making progress in this direction might be to appeal to panel data to show which well-
being measures are the strongest predictors of individual future behaviours (such as moving 
house, quitting one's job, or getting divorced). It would also be possible to look at individual 
morbidity and mortality outcomes along the same lines. The ESS is unfortunately not panel, 
and so cannot be used in this way. It has however introduced a much broader menu of well-
being questions than is typically found in social science surveys, and the inclusion of some of 
these in existing panel surveys would arguably be an important step forward in broadening 








































Table 1. Life Satisfaction and Happiness in Wave 3 of the European Social Survey 
How happy are you?  Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percentage 
Life satisfaction as a 
whole 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percentage 
            
Extremely unhappy  147 0  0  Extremely dissatisfied  477 2  2 
1  183 1  1  1  380 1  3 
2  367 1  2  2  648 2  5 
3  688 2  4  3  1082 3  8 
4  853 3  7  4  1236 4  12 
5 2921  9  17  5  3355  11  23 
6  2566 8  25  6  2682 9  32 
7  5944 19  44  7  5392 17  49 
8  8966 29  72  8  8144 26  75 
9  5427 17  90  9  4783 15  90 
Extremely happy  3161 10  100  Extremely satisfied  3116 10  100 
Total        31222    Total          31294     
Note: Weighted statistics. Sample: Aged between 16 and 65. 
 
Table 2. Pairwise correlations between Hedonic and Eudaimonic Measures of Well-Being 
Happiness Life Satisfaction Flourishing Vitality Resilience Functioning
Happiness 1
Life Satisfaction 0.6106 1
Flourishing 0.2718 0.2629 1
Vitality 0.2573 0.2574 0.2752 1
Resilience 0.2635 0.2608 0.4967 0.3207 1
Functioning 0.2866 0.2987 0.3126 0.3084 0.3105 1
 
 
Table 3. Eudaimonia scores, by levels of Hedonic Well-Being 
Flourishing Vitality Resilience Functioning
High Life Satisfaction 69.2 62.7 62.7 64.8
Low Life Satisfaction 43.1 37.0 36.7 34.9
High Happiness 68.5 61.7 61.8 62.9
Low Happiness 41.4 35.8 35.3 34.1










































1Table 4. Hedonic and Eudaimonic Well-Being Regressions 
Life Satisfaction Happiness Flourishing Vitality Resilience Functioning
Male -0.052** -0.074** 0.090** 0.946** 0.582** 0.021
(0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.060) (0.036) (0.052)
Age -0.051** -0.056** -0.005 -0.116** -0.105** -0.054**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.018) (0.010) (0.015)
Age-squared/1000 0.539** 0.565** -0.014 1.325** 1.125** 1.070**
(0.047) (0.047) (0.059) (0.205) (0.121) (0.178)
Secondary Education 0.047** 0.025 0.149** 0.349** 0.328** 0.487**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.076) (0.045) (0.066)
Tertiary Education 0.090** 0.069** 0.243** 0.408** 0.357** 0.946**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.085) (0.050) (0.074)
Separated -0.267** -0.339** -0.085** -0.471** -0.177** -0.284**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.028) (0.096) (0.056) (0.083)
Widowed -0.310** -0.492** -0.127* -1.699** -0.385** -0.266
(0.039) (0.039) (0.050) (0.173) (0.101) (0.152)
Never in Couple -0.200** -0.322** -0.129** -0.271** -0.337** -0.259**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.025) (0.084) (0.050) (0.073)
Log Income 0.201** 0.164** 0.116** 0.545** 0.437** 0.517**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.040) (0.024) (0.035)
FT Education 0.093** 0.079** -0.019 -0.232 -0.121 0.197
(0.028) (0.028) (0.035) (0.121) (0.071) (0.104)
Active Unemployed -0.429** -0.273** -0.293** -0.847** -0.518** -1.531**
(0.034) (0.034) (0.043) (0.150) (0.088) (0.131)
Inactive Unemployed -0.366** -0.295** -0.427** -1.535** -0.801** -1.400**
(0.043) (0.043) (0.057) (0.191) (0.113) (0.168)
Sick or Disabled -0.473** -0.376** -0.470** -5.745** -1.542** -2.043**
(0.038) (0.038) (0.049) (0.166) (0.097) (0.146)
Retired 0.030 -0.007 -0.125** -1.000** -0.156* -0.156
(0.028) (0.029) (0.036) (0.125) (0.074) (0.109)
Community or Military Service 0.145 0.019 -0.068 0.473 0.282 -0.052
(0.154) (0.155) (0.196) (0.670) (0.406) (0.595)
Housework, looking after children, others 0.028 0.040* 0.003 -0.079 -0.055 -0.052
(0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.076) (0.045) (0.066)
Other 0.022 0.047 0.100 -0.336 0.063 0.018
(0.050) (0.051) (0.064) (0.219) (0.130) (0.192)
Austria 0.462** 0.213** 0.172** 1.442** 0.077 1.250**
(0.039) (0.039) (0.050) (0.173) (0.102) (0.150)
Belgium 0.287** 0.265** -0.164** -0.148 -1.032** 0.142
(0.038) (0.038) (0.048) (0.165) (0.098) (0.142)
Bulgaria -0.404** -0.468** 0.134* 0.848** 0.280* 0.683**
(0.048) (0.048) (0.062) (0.216) (0.126) (0.186)
Switzerland 0.555** 0.486** 0.259** 0.903** -0.200* 1.032**
(0.040) (0.040) (0.051) (0.171) (0.102) (0.148)
Denmark 0.901** 0.681** 0.251** 0.086 -0.198 2.299**
(0.041) (0.041) (0.051) (0.174) (0.103) (0.150)
Spain 0.452** 0.413** 0.166** -0.334 0.018 -1.343**
(0.043) (0.043) (0.054) (0.185) (0.110) (0.161)
Finland 0.590** 0.528** 0.130** 0.154 -1.287** 0.175
(0.038) (0.038) (0.047) (0.163) (0.096) (0.140)
France -0.149** 0.044 -0.256** -0.346* -0.978** -0.928**
(0.037) (0.037) (0.047) (0.162) (0.096) (0.140)
United Kingdom 0.136** 0.152** -0.025 -1.275** -0.990** -1.027**
(0.037) (0.037) (0.047) (0.162) (0.096) (0.140)
Ireland 0.304** 0.287** 0.262** 0.318 -0.355** 0.512**
(0.041) (0.041) (0.052) (0.179) (0.105) (0.155)
Latvia -0.094* -0.183** -0.080 -0.017 -0.910** -1.295**
(0.040) (0.040) (0.051) (0.177) (0.104) (0.154)
Netherlands 0.372** 0.294** -0.007 0.441** -0.608** 0.702**
(0.038) (0.038) (0.047) (0.163) (0.096) (0.141)
Norway 0.362** 0.361** 0.079 0.493** -0.986** 0.325*
(0.037) (0.037) (0.047) (0.161) (0.096) (0.139)
Poland 0.250** 0.148** -0.012 0.360* -0.143 0.459**
(0.041) (0.041) (0.052) (0.180) (0.106) (0.157)
Portugal -0.435** -0.224** 0.279** -1.778** -0.095 -0.963**
(0.044) (0.045) (0.056) (0.194) (0.115) (0.168)
Russia -0.286** -0.225** -0.301** -0.030 -0.210* 0.082
(0.041) (0.041) (0.053) (0.183) (0.107) (0.160)
Sweden 0.536** 0.460** 0.110* -0.019 -0.684** -0.193
(0.037) (0.037) (0.047) (0.160) (0.095) (0.139)
Slovenia 0.243** 0.203** 0.099 0.668** -0.138 -0.315*
(0.042) (0.042) (0.053) (0.184) (0.109) (0.159)
Slovakia -0.117** -0.135** -0.121* -0.717** -1.322** -0.420*
(0.044) (0.044) (0.055) (0.193) (0.114) (0.166)
Constant -0.562** -1.911** -0.788** -3.665**
(0.146) (0.504) (0.297) (0.437)
Observations 24297 24247 23773 23694 23917 23317
Log-Likelihood -47346.81 -44715.03 -15496.34 -68824.05 -56948.91 -64182.61
Log-Likelihood at zero -50460.01 -47167.79 -16299.51 -70480.96 -58139.32 -65784.43
R-squared 0.131 0.095 0.128
Note: The omitted categories are: primary education, married, employed and Germany. Standard errors in parentheses.









































1Table 5. The Correlation Between the Estimated Coefficients in Table 4 





Vitality 0.545 0.483 0.579
[0.592] [0.506] [0.523]
Resilience 0.133 0.091 0.457 0.553
[0.094] [0.040] [0.483] [0.499]
Functioning 0.641 0.536 0.614 0.686 0.491
[0.610] [0.540] [0.556] [0.763] [0.443]
 
Note: The first figure in each cell refers to the Pearson correlation coefficient; the figure underneath it 









































1Table 6. Flourishing but Not Satisfied 
Flourishing Vitality Resilience Functioning
Male 0.082** 0.202** 0.195** 0.053**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
Age 0.035** 0.019** 0.014* 0.026**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age-squared/1000 -0.394** -0.216** -0.136 -0.199**
(0.067) (0.070) (0.071) (0.070)
Secondary Education 0.086** 0.046 0.088** 0.069**
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Tertiary Education 0.078** -0.030 0.023 0.107**
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Separated 0.094** 0.071* 0.073* 0.124**
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031)
Widowed 0.016 -0.138* 0.009 0.105*
(0.055) (0.060) (0.057) (0.053)
Never in Couple 0.077** 0.126** 0.047 0.119**
(0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
Log Income -0.021 -0.038** 0.015 -0.011
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
FT Education -0.042 -0.127** -0.064 -0.077
(0.040) (0.041) (0.042) (0.044)
Active Unemployed -0.059 0.004 0.000 -0.165**
(0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.052)
Inactive Unemployed -0.177** -0.087 -0.129* -0.092
(0.063) (0.063) (0.065) (0.064)
Sick or Disabled -0.144** -0.681** -0.187** -0.072
(0.055) (0.074) (0.059) (0.055)
Retired -0.124** -0.105* -0.102* -0.056
(0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.041)
Community or Military Service -0.008 -0.013 0.140 -0.490
(0.223) (0.219) (0.220) (0.304)
Housework, looking after children, others -0.031 -0.047 -0.035 -0.010
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Other 0.128 -0.141 0.037 -0.133
(0.070) (0.077) (0.075) (0.079)
Austria -0.306** -0.120* -0.424** -0.233**
(0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.057)
Belgium -0.385** -0.279** -0.513** -0.207**
(0.054) (0.056) (0.056) (0.054)
Bulgaria 0.234** 0.163* 0.212** 0.286**
(0.063) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064)
Switzerland -0.506** -0.325** -0.680** -0.370**
(0.058) (0.059) (0.060) (0.058)
Denmark -0.731** -0.711** -1.025** -0.606**
(0.064) (0.069) (0.071) (0.064)
Spain -0.214** -0.349** -0.336** -0.670**
(0.059) (0.064) (0.060) (0.072)
Finland -0.660** -0.706** -1.154** -0.688**
(0.057) (0.062) (0.070) (0.061)
France -0.084 0.099 -0.180** -0.101
(0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052)
United Kingdom -0.174** -0.324** -0.370** -0.371**
(0.051) (0.055) (0.052) (0.055)
Ireland -0.104 -0.227** -0.325** -0.209**
(0.055) (0.059) (0.057) (0.058)
Latvia -0.007 0.004 -0.315** -0.306**
(0.053) (0.055) (0.056) (0.059)
Netherlands -0.387** -0.187** -0.444** -0.230**
(0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Norway -0.366** -0.291** -0.668** -0.294**
(0.052) (0.055) (0.056) (0.054)
Poland -0.162** -0.020 -0.134* -0.040
(0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.058)
Portugal 0.543** -0.092 0.339** 0.050
(0.057) (0.063) (0.057) (0.061)
Russia -0.139* 0.051 -0.001 0.000
(0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057)
Sweden -0.434** -0.448** -0.782** -0.458**
(0.053) (0.056) (0.058) (0.055)
Slovenia -0.099 0.037 -0.154** -0.174**
(0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.061)
Slovakia -0.020 -0.095 -0.401** 0.027
(0.059) (0.062) (0.063) (0.061)
Constant -1.273** -0.970** -1.161** -1.507**
(0.163) (0.168) (0.172) (0.174)
Observations 24354 24354 24354 24354
Log-Likelihood -11786.14 -10756.74 -10524.24 -10611.38
Log-Likelihood at zero -12271.16 -11215.79 -11163.99 -10993.87
Note: The omitted categories are: primary education, married, employed and Germany. 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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